Structural and Institutional Drivers of Investor–Smallholder Land Conflicts in Kilombero, Tanzania

Abstract

Tanzania’s promotion of agricultural commercialization has generated persistent land conflicts between investor farmers and smallholders. This paper argues that these conflicts are not simply the result of competing land uses but are embedded in the structural and institutional weaknesses of the Tanzanian land governance framework. The paper examines the influence of the Tanzanian land governance framework in the investor – smallholder land conflicts. The study was conducted at the Kilombero Plantations Limited (KPL), in Kilombero District, Tanzania, in June 2019. Drawing on a qualitative case study, the study analyses archival records, legal frameworks, and data from four semi-structured interviews and a focus group discussion with village leaders. Findings point to five key structural drivers. First, there are unresolved issues from villagisation. Second, there is exclusion of village institutions after the land turns into general land. There is also confusion between compensation and discretionary compassionate payments, and denial of long-term occupation claims due to the prohibition of adverse possession. Lastly, there is weak enforcement of land development conditions. These institutional factors systematically restrict community rights, concentrate authority in central agencies, institutionalize exclusion, diminish tenure security and contribute to land conflicts. The paper extends debates on land conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by connecting local grievances to systemic governance failures. The paper argues for structural reforms that decentralize authority, clarify compensation regimes, and strengthen accountability in land investment processes.